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Abstract: Child labor laws should aim to protect children who work, instead
of trying to remove children from work. In this paper, we identify an instance
when the risk of exploitation lowers the expected bene￿t of child labor to the child,
and therefore suppresses child labor force participation. Targeted legal intervention
that lowers or removes the risk of exploitation raises child participation in the labor
market, child welfare, and overall societal welfare. Targeting on child labor more
broadly may reduce child labor force participation, child welfare, and overall societal
welfare. Our key assumptions for generating these results are that parents decide for
each child based on their child￿ s best interest, that parents face imperfect information
about the risks their children confront upon entering the labor market, and that ￿rms
may choose to exploit this information imperfection by employing children under
forced-labor-type conditions.
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The purpose of this paper is to construct a model of child labor in which choosing
to enter the labor force can make a child worse o⁄ than she otherwise would have
been. There is a large literature in economics that models why children work but
does not distinguish explicitly between work that is "exploitative" and work that is
not.1 The policy discussion, however, is largely concerned with exploitation. A
model of exploitative child labor is essential for understanding both how to target
policies as well as what their likely e⁄ects will be. In this paper, we show that if
parents are not fully informed about the working opportunities that their children
face and ￿rms take advantage of this imperfect information, then some children who
enter the labor market may be exploited. In this context, carefully targeted legal
intervention to end "exploitative" child labor is welfare improving, and an indicator
of the welfare improvement is an increase in the labor force participation rate of
children.
In early policy discussions, it was often assumed that all work by children is
necessarily harmful. By the mid-1990s, it became more commonly understood that
some work could be bene￿cial for children, since it could allow them to achieve at
least a subsistence level of consumption or to acquire skills. In this spirit, the
term "exploitative child labor" has generally come to distinguish certain work that
is somehow clearly harmful to the children involved (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 1996; Swinnerton, 1997). In 1999, the 184 member
nations of the International Labor Organization (ILO) passed the ￿Worst Forms of
Child Labor Convention￿(Convention 182).2 Article 3 of Convention 182 de￿nes
the ￿Worst Forms￿as:
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale
and tra¢ cking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or com-
pulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children
for use in armed con￿ ict;
(b) the use, procuring or o⁄ering of a child for prostitution, for the
production of pornography or for pornographic performances;
(c) the use, procuring or o⁄ering of a child for illicit activities, in
particular for the production and tra¢ cking of drugs as de￿ned in the
1Two interesting reviews of this literature are Kaushik Basu (1999) and Eric V. Edmonds and
Nina Pavcnik (2005).
2An ILO Convention has the status of an international treaty. After it is passed, each country
decides whether or not to ratify it. As of this writing, 156 countries had rati￿ed Convention 182.
(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/docs/declworld.htm)
1relevant international treaties;
(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is
carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
To our way of thinking, Convention 182 seeks to identify a set of practices that
should be avoided. These practices are proscribed because of a belief that if children
are engaged in the worst forms, exploitation necessarily occurs, because they could
be better o⁄ doing something else. But if they would be better o⁄ doing something
else, how do children end up as exploited child laborers?
One possibility is that they are stolen outright. In this case, the preferences of
the children or their parents do not ￿gure into what happens to the children. Other
explanations start from the observation that in most instances, parents decide what
their children will do. One of two assumptions can then be made. The ￿rst is that
parents do what is in their own or the household￿ s best interest, regardless of what
is in an individual child￿ s best interest. If the child ends up as an exploited child
laborer, the parent can be depicted as willingly deciding to exploit the child. The
other assumption is that parents always decide for their children based on what is
in the best interests of the children. In this event, it is still possible for children to
end up being exploited if the parents are tricked or deceived, i.e., if they rationally
believe that they are doing what is best, but it turns out that they are not. Similarly,
if children make their own utility-maximizing decisions, trickery or deception could
lead them into exploitative situations.
All three routes to exploitative child labor appear to exist in the world today.
It also appears that once a child enters into an exploitative situation, a variety of
barriers to escape may be erected to prevent the child from leaving. Typically, these
barriers involve in some way the removal of the child from their parents￿household,
and the child loses access to the ￿nancial and emotional support that their parents
may have provided.
We give just a few anecdotes.3 The United States Department of Labor (USDOL,
1999) reports that in Burma, young boys are often abducted from school and forced
to act as porters for the military. Lim (1998) discusses how children enter the sex
sector in Southeast Asia. She emphasizes the role of persuasion, deception or threats
from adults in getting children to enter the trade. Sometimes the adult responsible
is a child￿ s parent, but other times parents agree to the removal of children from
their home on the belief that the child is going to be o⁄ered a training, educational,
or work opportunity that will actually improve the child￿ s situation. In a case study
3There is no well documented statistically representative information on the incidence of the
worst forms of child labor.
2of the tra¢ cking of Nepali girls and women to brothels in Bombay, Human Rights
Watch/Asia (1995) suggests that while outright abduction is sometimes the way that
girls are forced into prostitution, deception or fraud is more common. Promises of
marriage or better jobs lead poor parents or the girls themselves to decide that
the girls leave Nepal for Bombay. In many cases these promises are not realized,
and the girls ￿nd themselves in brothels. A number of di⁄erent strategies may be
employed to keep girls compliant and to prevent them from leaving. These include
physical restraint from escape, violent beatings, psychological abuse, depriving the
girls of appropriate street clothing, and concealing from them where they actually
are. Typically any money that changes hands in payment for the girls￿work is not
seen by the girls, and they have no idea of the amounts paid.
Only a few researchers have sought to apply economic theory to exploitative or
worst-forms child labor per se.4 Arnab K. Basu and Nancy H. Chau (2003, 2004) de-
velop a model in which the only way for rural parents to smooth consumption across
lean and harvest seasons is through an interlinked credit-labor contract (bonded la-
bor). They show that if bonded child labor occurs in equilibrium, then households
would have been better o⁄had parents made a commitment to keep their children out
of work. An e⁄ective commitment would have led to much higher parental wages. On
this basis of this implication for household welfare, Basu and Chau classify bonded
child labor as exploitative.5
Sylvain Dessy and StØphane Pallage (2005) suggest that some children enter
worst-forms jobs because they pay better than other jobs available to children. In
the context of extreme poverty and full information that Dessy and Pallage envision,
the compensating di⁄erential for the "harm" done by a worst-form of child labor is
enough to make it privately and socially preferable to the harm that might be done
by forcing children to accept a lower paid job and su⁄ering a dismally low material
standard of living. This accords with the long-standing warning that has emanated
from economists￿discussion of child labor: if the work is the best opportunity avail-
able to a child according to her preferences, then the individual child is not made
better o⁄ by taking the opportunity to work away.
We believe that the policy interest in exploitative or worst forms of child labor
4There is also an emerging empirical literature that may be viewed as trying to assess what
kinds of child labor should qualify as a worst form under Article 3(d) of Convention 182. Sarah
Gormly and Amy Ritualo (2005) identify a number of other relevant references.
5The possible negative impact of child labor on adult wage is a theme in the more general applied
theory literature on child labor. The best known example is Kaushik Basu and Pham Hoang Van
(1998). The general e⁄ect of credit market imperfections on child labor has also been explored,
most famously by Jean-Marie Baland and James Robinson (2000). A. Basu and Chau bring the
two themes together and apply them to the specifc context of a worst form of child labor.
3emanates from a concern that these types of labor are not the best opportunities
available to children.6 In our model, parents must decide whether to keep a child
at home or to send her out to the market to work. If the child stays home, the
parents contribute to the child￿ s consumption. If the child goes to the market to
work, then she leaves behind her home and her parents￿contribution. Her utility is
determined by the wage she earns in the market. At the point when a child leaves
home to go to the market, neither she nor her parents knows for certain whether the
job she will ￿nd will pay a "good" wage. If she does, then she is better o⁄ than if
she had stayed home. But if she does not, she may be worse o⁄. So the promise of
a good wage may induce the parents to send their child to the market to work, but
the possibility of a bad wage may mean that ex post the promise is not ful￿lled and
the parents may feel "tricked."
The uncertainty facing families provides an opportunity that may be exploited
by ￿rms that employ child labor. A ￿rm may decide to imprison children who come
to it looking for work, and force them to work just for subsistence. Keeping these
imprisoned children from escaping is not costless: it gets harder and more expen-
sive the more prisoners a ￿rm has. Imprisonment is the "exploitative recruitment
strategy." Alternatively, a ￿rm may o⁄er a wage and allow the children who apply
to decide whether to accept work at the ￿rm. We refer to this as the "competitive
recruitment strategy." Each ￿rm chooses its recruitment strategy based on which is
more pro￿table.
In equilibrium, ￿rms sort into exploitative and competitive sectors. Associated
with this sorting is an endogenously determined competitive sector wage, and an
endogenously determined probability of exploitation. The probability of exploitation
and the competitive wage lead households collectively to supply just enough children
to the market so as to support the equilibrium sorting of ￿rms.
The next section describes the ￿rm side of the model. We take the child labor
supply as given, and analyze the sorting that occurs. We model household behavior
in Section 3. In Section 4, we bring the two sides of the model together to examine
characteristics of equilibrium. There may be multiple equilibria. Under some
circumstances, all ￿rms would have higher pro￿ts if no ￿rms exploited child workers,
so that an equilibrium with exploitation can be seen as the result of failure of ￿rms
to coordinate recruitment strategies. Under other circumstances, there is no such
coordination failure; however, even in these instances, regulation may be used to
create a unique equilibrium with no exploitative child labor. Section 5 uses the model
6At least one other paper (Dessy and Pallage, 2003) has picked up on the concern we highlight.
We discuss their adaptation of the household side of our model at appropriate points later in the
paper.
4to analyze the e⁄ects of legal interventions that aim to reduce exploitative child labor.
Our main ￿ndings are that regulations targeted speci￿cally on exploitative practices
can be Pareto-improving, while mistakes in targeting that lead to broader attempts
to remove children from the labor force can leave children worse o⁄. Regulations
that lead to a decline in child labor force participation are bad for children. Section
6 concludes.
2 Firms
Suppose L children are available to be employed by K ex ante identical ￿rms. Every
￿rm uses one unit of capital7 and employs only child labor to produce a single
consumption good, which is the numeraire. A ￿rm￿ s production function is given by
f(‘), with f0 > 0, f00 < 0, lim‘!0 f(‘) = 1, and where ‘ is its input of child labor.
A ￿rm can decide to recruit children by capturing them, or instead by purchasing
their services on the competitive market. A ￿rm￿ s sta¢ ng level (‘) depends on its
recruitment strategy.
If a ￿rm chooses to recruit children by capturing them, then it provides each child
with a level of consumption, s, that is just su¢ cient to ensure the child￿ s survival
and usefulness to the ￿rm. Since imprisoned children may try to escape, we assume
that the ￿rm bears an imprisonment cost of c(‘) to prevent them from doing so. It
is natural to assume that group insurrection, rebellion and escape are increasingly
likely with larger numbers of prisoners; therefore, c0(‘) > 0 and c00(‘) > 0. The ￿rm
chooses the number of children it wants to capture to maximize pro￿t, ￿e:
￿e = f(‘) ￿ s‘ ￿ c(‘). (1)
The ￿rst order condition associated with this problem,
f
0(b ‘e) = s + c
0(b ‘e); (2)
implicitly de￿nes b ‘e, the ￿rm￿ s desired sta¢ ng level. We note for future reference
that b ‘e is determined by s and by parameters of the production and cost functions, all
of which are exogenous variables. Note that the "wage" that the captured children
receive (s) is less than the marginal product of labor (f0(b ‘e)).
In equilibrium, it may turn out that an exploitative ￿rm is unable to achieve
its desired sta¢ ng level. In this event, the ￿rm￿ s actual sta¢ ng level, will be less
than b ‘e, and the marginal product of labor will exceed the marginal cost (s+c0(‘e)).
7The economy has an endowment of K units of capital.
5To allow for this possibility, we denote by ‘e the actual sta¢ ng level of exploitative
￿rms, where ‘e ￿ b ‘e. We denote exploitative-￿rm pro￿ts as a function of its sta¢ ng
level by ￿e(‘e).
Instead of capturing and exploiting children, a ￿rm may follow a competitive
recruitment strategy. In this strategy, the ￿rm o⁄ers a wage, w, and lets children
decide whether to take employment with the ￿rm. The wage w is a competitive
wage determined by competition among ￿rms who do not exploit child workers, and
for child workers who are not absorbed by ￿rms following the exploitative strategy.
If a ￿rm chooses the competitive strategy, it takes the wage as given and chooses
employment to maximize its pro￿t, ￿c:
￿c = f(‘) ￿ w‘: (3)
The ￿rm￿ s optimal sta¢ ng level, ‘c, satis￿es the ￿rst order condition
f
0(‘c) = w. (4)
The demand for labor implied by expression (4) is a decreasing function of the wage.
We denote this function by ‘c(w). Expressions (3) and (4) imply that a competitive
￿rm￿ s pro￿t decreases as the competitive wage increases. We denote competitive-
￿rm pro￿t as a function of the wage by ￿c(w).
Each ￿rm chooses a recruitment strategy that yields the highest possible pro￿t.
A ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, ￿, is therefore given by
￿ = max[￿e(‘e);￿c(w)]. (5)
Firms may be found in both sectors only if ￿e(‘e) = ￿c(w). Otherwise, they will
move to the sector that o⁄ers the higher pro￿t.
Having described each individual ￿rm￿ s decision problem, we now determine how
￿rm-level decisions aggregate up to an allocation of ￿rms and workers into the ex-
ploitative and competitive sectors. Let N 2 [0;K] be the number of ￿rms that choose
the exploitative strategy, so that N‘e children are employed in the exploitative sector.
We assume that each child in the market is as likely as any other to be captured;





Children who are not captured are left to be employed in the competitive mar-
ket. There are K ￿ N ￿rms in this market, each demanding ‘c(w) workers. Since
6the exploitative sector demands N‘e workers, the market-clearing condition for the
competitive sector is
(K ￿ N)‘c(w) = L ￿ N‘e.
We can use expression (6) to substitute for N in this market-clearing condition; with
some rearranging this yields:
pL + (K ￿
pL
‘e
)‘c(w) = L. (7)
The left-hand side of expression (7) is the aggregate demand for labor by both sectors.
The right-hand side is the aggregate supply of child labor.
Expressions (7) and (5) pin down the endogenous variables p and w. To get





Because there are L workers and K ￿rms in this market, and the labor market clears,
‘ is the average sta¢ ng level per ￿rm. The two cases we want to consider separately
are: (i) when ‘ > b ‘e; and, (ii) when ‘ ￿ b ‘e. Either of these cases is possible for
di⁄erent parameter values for the model.
2.1 ‘ > b ‘e: Competitive Firms Exist
Proposition 1 If ‘ > b ‘e, then it cannot be the case that all ￿rms choose to exploit.
Proof. If all ￿rms exploit, then desired employment per ￿rm equals b ‘e. But if ‘ > b ‘e,
this means some available workers must not be employed, so the labor market will
not clear. Therefore, if ‘ > b ‘e it cannot be a market-clearing outcome for all ￿rms
to exploit.
This Proposition ensures that if the average sta¢ ng level per ￿rm exceeds the
desired exploitative sta¢ ng level, then any sorting consistent with market clearing
must contain at least some competitive ￿rms. In any such sorting, every exploitative
￿rm sta⁄s at level b ‘e, so that when there are N exploitative ￿rms, the probability
of exploitation, p, equals Nb ‘e
L . Finally, if every exploitative ￿rm uses b ‘e children,
then competitive ￿rms must be larger than exploitative ￿rms (‘c > b ‘e); otherwise,
the average sta¢ ng level per-￿rm would be less than ‘ and the labor market would
not clear.
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate how expressions (5) and (7) determine p and w, for
given L. Figure 1a graphs competitive and exploitative pro￿ts against the wage
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rate, given the sta¢ ng level b ‘e at exploitative ￿rms. There is one wage where pro￿ts
are equal in both sectors. We denote this wage by b w, and note that it satis￿es:
f(b ‘e) ￿ sb ‘e ￿ c(b ‘e) = f(‘c(w)) ￿ w‘c(w): (8)
If both types of ￿rm exist, then pro￿t maximization implies that w must equal b w;
otherwise, pro￿ts would be higher in one sector or the other.
Figure 1b graphs labor market demand and supply. Consider ￿rst the solid pair
of lines in the Figure, which imply that, given p, expression (7) is satis￿ed when
the competitive wage is e w. As drawn e w > b w, so that at the wage that clears the
labor market, exploitative pro￿ts exceed competitive pro￿ts. In this event, ￿rms
migrate to the exploitative sector, thereby causing p to rise. The rise in p reduces
the aggregate demand for labor, since exploitative ￿rms demand less labor than
competitive ￿rms.8
As labor demand decreases, so does the market-clearing wage. Migration toward
the exploitative sector continues until the market clearing wage is low enough to
eliminate excess pro￿ts in the exploitative sector, that is, until e w = b w. See the
dotted line in Figure 1b. Thus, p may be found as the solution to:
pL + (K ￿
pL
b ‘e
)‘c(b w) = L (9)
8Since the di⁄erence between ‘c(w) and b ‘e is larger the lower is w, the new labor demand curve
is also steeper than the old one.
8Denote by e p the p that satis￿es expression (9):
e p =
‘c( ^ w)
￿ ‘ ￿ 1
‘c( ^ w)
^ ‘x ￿ 1
(10)
Because ‘c(^ w) > ￿ ‘ > b ‘e, it is straightforward to show that ~ p < 1.
Suppose we had started from a situation where the market-clearing wage, e w, was
below b w. In this instance, ￿c(e w) > ￿e(^ ‘e), so ￿rms would exit the exploitative
sector for the competitive one. This would lower the probability of exploitation and
cause labor demand to increase, causing e w to rise. This migration would continue
either until pro￿t was equalized across sectors, or until all ￿rms had migrated to the
competitive sector. In the former event, e w = b w and p = ~ p. In the latter, p = 0 and
e w ￿ b w is the solution to
‘c(e w) = ‘.
From expression (8), we see that b w is determined completely by exogenous para-
meters of the model. This allows us to identify when there will be no exploitation.
Proposition 2 If ‘ > ‘c(b w), then no ￿rms exploit (p = 0) and e w < b w.
Proof. ‘ > ‘c(b w) implies L > K‘c(b w) so that the market clearing wage, ~ w, if all
￿rms compete is less than b w. But then ￿c(~ w) > ￿e(^ ‘e). Since each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t in
the competitive sector is greater than the highest pro￿t it can earn in exploitative
sector, no ￿rm exploits.
2.2 ‘ ￿ b ‘e: All Firms Exploit
Proposition 3 If ‘ ￿ b ‘e, then every ￿rm exploits its workers (p = 1).
Proof. We show that if ‘ ￿ b ‘e, then any ￿rm that chose the competitive recruitment
strategy over the exploitative one would fail to maximize pro￿t.
If ‘ ￿ b ‘e, then employment per exploitative ￿rm, ‘e, will satisfy ￿ ‘ ￿ ‘e ￿ b ‘e. We
note that ￿ (‘e) increases over this range.
As noted in equation (4), w = f0(‘) for a competitive ￿rm. A competitive ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t can therefore be written as
f(‘) ￿ f
0(‘)‘,
which is increasing in ‘. Given market-clearing and ‘ ￿ b ‘e, any competitive ￿rm
must sta⁄ so that ‘c ￿ ￿ ‘, and competitive-￿rm pro￿t is highest if the exploitative
9sector leaves over enough workers so that ‘c = ￿ ‘ at each competitive ￿rm. But
exploitative-￿rm pro￿t is higher, as can be seen by subtracting competitive-￿rm
pro￿t from exploitative-￿rm pro￿t for the sta¢ ng level ￿ ‘:
￿




f(￿ ‘) ￿ f
0(￿ ‘)￿ ‘
￿
= ￿s￿ ‘ ￿ c(￿ ‘) + f
0(￿ ‘)￿ ‘.
Now since ￿ ‘ ￿ b ‘e, f0(￿ ‘) ￿ s + c0(￿ ‘). Therefore,
￿s￿ ‘ ￿ c(￿ ‘) + f
0(￿ ‘)￿ ‘ ￿ ￿c(￿ ‘) + c
0(￿ ‘)￿ ‘ > 0; (11)
where the ￿nal inequality follows from the fact that
￿c(￿ ‘) + c








The bracketed expression in expression (12) is the di⁄erence between marginal and
average imprisonment cost, and is unambiguously positive because c(‘) is monoton-
ically increasing in ‘. Thus, if ‘ ￿ b ‘e it is always more pro￿table for any ￿rm to
exploit, all ￿rms do, and the probability of exploitation faced by a child in the labor
market is unity.
Proposition 3 says that if average labor supply per ￿rm falls short of the desired
employment of ￿rms should they all choose to exploit, then all ￿rms will exploit.
Since average per-￿rm employment is ￿ ‘ and all ￿rms choose the same recruitment
strategy, ‘e = ￿ ‘: Since p = 1, there is no supply of labor left over for the competitive
sector, no competitive sector, and therefore, no well-de￿ned competitive-sector wage.
For the sake of completeness, it is of some interest to ask what wage would cause
a ￿rm to consider switching to the competitive recruitment strategy. The answer to
this question is the shadow competitive wage, ws, and it satis￿es ￿e(‘) = ￿c(ws), i.e.,
f(‘) ￿ s‘ ￿ c(‘) = f(‘c(ws)) ￿ ws‘c(ws).
When exploitative ￿rms are able to achieve their optimal sta¢ ng level, then
b w is the highest wage consistent with the existence of any competitive ￿rms. If
‘e = ￿ ‘ ￿ ^ ‘e, then exploitative pro￿ts are no higher than at this optimal sta¢ ng level.
The shadow competitive wage must therefore be higher than b w. Thus, when all
￿rms choose the exploitative strategy, it is because ws is too high.
102.3 Summary
We summarize the results of our discussion of the ￿rm side of the model with reference
to the exogenously determined values ^ ‘e and ^ w. In expression (13), below, p and
w (or ws) are probability of exploitation and wage (or shadow wage) outcomes that
clear the market and ensure that each ￿rm is maximizing pro￿t.
Condition p is w (or ws) satis￿es
If ￿ ‘ < ^ ‘e 1 ws > ^ w





￿1 w = b w
If ￿ ‘ > ‘c(b w) 0 w = f0(‘) < b w
(13)
In developing the analysis of ￿rm behavior, we have treated L, and therefore ￿ ‘,
as exogenous. These values are determined by household decisions. We turn to
these decisions now.
3 Households
The key results of our model hold with any household preference structure where:
(i) each household￿ s utility is increasing in each of its children￿ s utility; and, (ii)
each child￿ s utility is increasing in her consumption. The results we derive are not
altered by considerations of an individual child￿ s labor-leisure trade-o⁄, or trade-o⁄s
that parents may make among their children; therefore, we can proceed most simply
by analyzing the household￿ s decision problem as if it sought simply to maximize
the utility of an individual child, and as if that child only enjoys utility from the
consumption of the single physical good.
Letting c be a child￿ s consumption, s the amount she needs to consume to survive,





0 if c < s
c if c ￿ s
c ￿ G if c ￿ s and gone.
(14)
From their own income or wealth, parents provide Y toward the support of their
child. The child is also endowed with one unit of time. If the child stays home, then
11her time can be converted into ￿ units of the consumption good. If she is sent into
the market to work, then with probability p she will be captured into an exploitative
job that pays s; with probability 1 ￿ p, she ￿nds a job that pays w. Parents take p
and w as given.
In light of their constraints, parents choose either to keep their child at home, or
to send her to the market to work, by evaluating
maxfY + ￿;ps + (1 ￿ p)w ￿ Gg: (15)
If ps + (1 ￿ p)w ￿ G > Y + ￿, then the child goes to the market to work.
Assume that the number of households is normalized to one and that there is a
non-degenerate distribution of non-child-related wealth across households, perhaps
due to di⁄erences across household in parental human or physical capital ownership.9
So long as parents￿altruism toward their children is uncorrelated with their wealth,
and because of our assumption on the household￿ s preference structure, we know
that parental contributions to child consumption will increase with non-child-related
wealth. Households with greater wealth will make larger contributions. Let A(Y )
be the resulting continuous distribution of parental contributions.
It is easy to see from expression (15) that for given values of p and w there exists
a unique value of Y , call it e Y , such that parents who can a⁄ord a contribution of e Y
will be indi⁄erent between keeping their children at home or sending them into the
market to work:
e Y = ps + (1 ￿ p)w ￿ G ￿ ￿: (16)
It is also easy to see that wealthier parents who can a⁄ord contributions larger than
e Y will keep their children at home, while poorer parents will send their children to
out to the market to work.
Wealth allows parents to shield children from the risk of exploitation, but the
poorest parents can never provide such a shield. If Y < s ￿ ￿, then it is impossible
to provide home-based subsistence for a child, and even if exploitation is certain, the
child will go into the market to work. This situation may arise in a household if
(i) s > ￿ by enough that a child￿ s home production cannot make up the di⁄erence
between a very small parental contribution and her subsistence needs; (ii) a household
9In earlier versions of this paper, we assumed no heterogeneity in contributions made by parents.
The ￿ avor of our results came instead from allowing non-exploited children to make labor-leisure
trade-o⁄s. In an adaptation of the household side of our model, Dessy and Pallage (2003) made
the heterogeneity assumption we now make here. It turns out to make for a cleaner and more
intuitive way to establish our points, and it was recommended by a referee. Unlike us either in
earlier versions or now, Dessy and Pallage (2003) did not model the endogenous sorting of ￿rms
into exploitative and competitive sectors.
12has a su¢ ciently high level of debt (negative wealth) so that the child ends up
contributing to the household rather than vice versa; or (iii) some combination of
the two. In our discussion going forward, we would like to allow for some segment
of households who cannot provide for their children without sending the children out
to work; however, it does not matter analytically which of the three situations just
described causes this. For convenience, we rule out indebtedness and proceed by
assuming that A(Y ) has a lower support of zero and that a child working at home
is incapable of producing her own subsistence consumption bundle, i.e. ￿ < s.
We also assume that A(s￿￿) < K‘c(^ w). This parameterization ensures that all
children in the labor market consume at least s. So while the poorest households
must assume the risk of exploitation, they do not su⁄er the death of their children.
From a technical standpoint, this parameterization also ensures that A(Y ) is stable.
If we allowed poor children to die, we would have to update the distribution of
parental contributions.
Since children are sent to work by every household with Y < e Y , the supply of
children to the market is A(e Y ); because the population of children is normalized to
one, this is also the market labor force participation rate. The number of children
per ￿rm in the market is A(e Y )=K. When the child-labor market clears, this is the
same as the average sta¢ ng level per ￿rm, so that
￿ ‘ =
A(ps + (1 ￿ p)w ￿ G ￿ ￿)
K
: (17)
We emphasize that expression (17) was derived on the assumption of market clearing,
and that it ensures that all households maximize utility given their constraints. It
also shows that ￿ ‘ is a function of only two endogenous variables: p and w.
4 Equilibrium
Expression (13) shows, for given aggregate labor supply, the probability of exploita-
tion and the wage when pro￿t maximization for all ￿rms accompanies labor market
clearing. Expression (17) shows for given p and w what aggregate labor supply
is consistent with household utility maximization. Each expression contains three
endogenous variables: p; w and ￿ ‘. Equilibrium values of these variables, p￿, w￿ and
￿ ‘￿, satisfy each simultaneously. The equilibrium number of exploitative ￿rms N￿
may be recovered from the identity (6).
Because of the relationship of the wage to the conditions in expression (13), it is
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￿1; b ‘e ￿ ￿ ‘ ￿ ‘c(b w)
0; ‘c(b w) < ￿ ‘
(18)
The graph of this function is shown in Figure 2. The downward sloping portion of
p(￿ ‘) follows because in the range where it occurs, increasing ￿ ‘ leads to proportionally
more children ending up employed in competitive ￿rms. This is because exploitative
￿rms are already sta⁄ed to their optimal levels and are earning their highest possible
pro￿ts. Any extra children that show up at their doors are returned to the compet-
itive labor market, putting downward pressure on the competitive wage and driving
up competitive pro￿ts. Some exploitative ￿rms then migrate to the competitive
sector, and therefore the probability of exploitation falls.
Since we have assumed parameter values of the model such that b w > s, expression
(17) also implies an inverse relationship between ￿ ‘ and p. As the risk of exploitation
falls, some subset of the wealthier families who had formerly kept their children out
of the market because of the risk of exploitation, now send their children into the
market. The shape of the graph is governed by the shape of A(:). For convenience,
14we will refer to this curve as the "household curve," in what follows.
The next three Propositions establish that an equilibrium always exists. The
￿rst two identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a "one-sector equilibrium,"
i.e., one in which either all ￿rms exploit or all ￿rms compete. The third shows that
if no one-sector equilibrium exists, then there must be a "two-sector equilibrium" in
which there are some of each type of ￿rm.
Proposition 4 An equilibrium exists in which p￿ = 1 if and only if
A(s￿G￿￿)
K ￿ b ‘e.
Proof. First we show that if
A(s￿G￿￿)
K ￿ b ‘e, then there is an equilibrium with
p = 1. From expression (17), p = 1 implies ‘ =
A(s￿G￿￿)
K . From expression (13),
‘ =
A(s￿G￿￿)
K ￿ b ‘e implies p(‘) = 1.
On the other hand, if
A(s￿G￿￿)
K > b ‘e, then since p = 1 implies ￿ ‘ =
A(s+G￿￿)
K , we
know that ￿ ‘ > b ‘e, which by expression (13) implies p cannot be equal to unity.
Proposition 5 An equilibrium exists in which p￿ = 0, if and only if ‘c(b w) ￿
A(b w￿G￿￿)
K .
Proof. If ‘c(b w) ￿
A(b w￿G￿￿)
K , then an equilibrium exists in which p￿ = 0. To establish
this, ￿rst we ￿nd the equilibrium wage when all ￿rms are competitive; then, we show
that at this wage and at p = 0, both the household and ￿rm equilibrium conditions
(expressions (17) and (13)) are satis￿ed.
De￿ne z(w) =
A(w￿G￿￿)
K ￿ ‘c(w). z(w) is continuous. z(G + ￿) < 0, since
A(0) = 0. z(b w) ￿ 0 by the condition of the proposition. By the continuity of z(w),
there exists a G + ￿ < w0 ￿ b w for which z(w0) = 0, i.e., at which the labor market
clears when all ￿rms are competitive. Now we show that there is an equilibrium
for the model in which (p￿;w￿) = (0;w0). For households: by expression (17),
(p;w) = (0;w0) implies ￿ ‘ =
A(w0￿G￿￿)
K . For ￿rms: since w0 ￿ b w, and
d‘c(w)
dw < 0, it
follows that ‘c(w0) ￿ ‘c(b w). Since ‘c(w0) = ￿ ‘, we have ‘c(b w) ￿ ￿ ‘. By expression
(13), this implies p￿ = 0.
On the other hand, if ‘c(b w) >
A(b w￿G￿￿)
K , then an equilibrium does not exist in
which p￿ = 0. If p = 0, then ￿ ‘ =
A(w0￿G￿￿)
K < ‘c(b w). Expression (13) implies that
in this event, p must be greater than zero.
Proposition 6 If a one-sector equilibrium does not exist, then a two-sector equilib-
rium must exist.
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Assume that a one-sector equilibrium does not exist. Any remaining candidate for
￿ ‘￿ must satisfy ^ ‘e ￿ ￿ ‘￿ ￿ ‘c(^ w). In that range, expression (13) tells us that ￿rm-side
equilibrium behavior requires that w = ^ w: We note that h(￿ ‘; ^ w) varies in ￿ ‘ only and
is continuous. We now show that it has a ￿xed point somewhere in the range of
candidate values for ￿ ‘￿. First, note that
h(^ ‘e; ^ w) = ^ ‘e ￿
A(s ￿ G ￿ ￿)
K
< 0; (19)
because, ^ ‘e ￿
A(s￿G￿￿)
K would be the case in an equilibrium where all ￿rms exploit,
and we have assumed that equilibrium does not exist. Now note that
h(‘c(^ w); ^ w) = ‘c(^ w) ￿
A(^ w ￿ G ￿ ￿)
K
> 0; (20)
because, ‘c(^ w) ￿
A( ^ w￿G￿￿)
K would be the case in an equilibrium when all ￿rms com-
pete, and we have assumed that equilibrium does not exist. Because of expressions
(19), (20) and continuity, h(￿ ‘; ^ w) must have a ￿xed point in the interval (^ ‘e;‘c(^ w)).
Although Figure 2 shows a unique equilibrium, the model may exhibit multiple
equilibria. Such a possibility is shown in Figure 3. This Figure shows a pair of
two-sector equilibria (A and B).10 The values of p￿ and of ￿ ‘￿ associated with the two-
sector equilibria can be read directly o⁄the Figure. In addition, since in the Figure,
‘c(^ w) <
A( ^ w￿G￿￿)
K , we know by Proposition 5 that there is also a third equilibrium in
10Only the equilibrium "A" is stable. Starting from "B," suppose some ￿rms decide to switch to
the competitive sector. This decrease in p would cause a larger increase in labor force participation
than needed by the new competitive ￿rms because the curve that shows labor force participation
lies to the right of the p(‘) curve. Competitive pro￿ts would rise relative to exploitative pro￿ts,
and more ￿rms would exit the exploitative sector. Since the labor force participation curve is still
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which p￿ = 0. We cannot label this equilibrium on the Figure, because this Figure
graphs p and ￿ ‘ in the plane w = b w . However, by expression (13), we know that the
wage (w￿) associated with the p￿ = 0 equilibrium will be lower than b w.
Figure 3 shows a situation in which a coordination failure could be responsible for
an equilibrium in which children are exploited in the labor market. If a su¢ ciently
large number of ￿rms could be persuaded to adopt the competitive recruitment
strategy, an economy that started out in equilibrium "A" could move to the p￿ = 0
equilibrium. However, there is no incentive for any individual ￿rm to make the move
on its own. In the absence of any coordinating mechanism, an economy that starts
out at equilibrium "A" remains there.
5 Policy Analysis
A regulatory system of inspections and ￿nes is a common strategy for addressing
child labor. In this section we explore the e⁄ects of such a system, and some issues
related to its enforcement. From this point onwards, we assume the economy is at
an equilibrium in which 1 > p￿ > 0, so that ‘e = b ‘e and some of the children in the
labor market are exploited.11
11Our results generalize to the case where p￿ = 1, but require additional explanations.
175.1 Legal Intervention Targeted on Exploitative Child Labor
Suppose ￿rms are randomly inspected, and if exploitative child labor is detected, then
a ￿ne per-child exploited is levied on the guilty ￿rm. We do not model the process
determining inspections and ￿nes explicitly, but instead assume that in tandem the




f(‘e) ￿ (s + x)‘e ￿ c(‘e), (21)




5.1.1 Eliminating Exploitative Child Labor
It is straightforward to show that the optimal employment level for an exploitative
￿rm, ^ ‘e, is a decreasing function of x. The legal intervention raises the expected
costs of capturing a worker, so an exploitative ￿rm does not want to capture as
many of them. The pro￿ts of exploitative ￿rms also are decreasing in x. When the
expected ￿ne, x, is imposed, ￿rms will therefore begin to exit that sector and move
to the competitive sector. As more ￿rms join the competitive sector, the aggregate
demand for labor will increase, because competitive ￿rms demand more labor than
exploitative ￿rms. As a result, the competitive wage will rise, until pro￿ts are again
equalized across sectors.
Figure 4 shows how an increase in x a⁄ects the probability of exploitation and
labor force participation. In this Figure, the dashed lines show the pre-regulatory
equilibrium, and the solid lines show the e⁄ects of regulation. Through its e⁄ect on
the competitive wage, the regulatory system has the immediate impact of raising the
expected value of market work, and thereby bringing more workers into the market
labor force (increasing ‘). In terms of Figure 4, there is a rightward rotation of the
household curve around the point p = 1. For ￿rms, an increase in x causes exit from
the exploitative sector. For given ‘, there is a downward shift of the p(￿ ‘) curve. As
a result of both shifts, the new equilibrium point is to the southeast of the original
equilibrium: ‘ rises, and p falls.
It is clear from Figure 4 that it is possible to ￿nd an expected ￿ne, x, that is large
enough that the household curve is everywhere to the right of the p(￿ ‘) curve. In
this event, the only possible equilibrium will be the one in which p￿ = 0. We denote











A regulatory system that leads to the expected ￿ne x0 is potentially Pareto improv-
ing, because it leaves a competitive (e¢ cient) equilibrium as the only possible one.
However, absent an additional program of redistribution, the system may not bene￿t
all agents in the economy. We now examine the e⁄ects on ￿rm pro￿ts and on child
welfare of moving from x = 0 to x = x0.
Because competitive pro￿ts are inversely related to the competitive wage, we
know that imposing x0 will make ￿rms better o⁄if the resulting equilibrium compet-
itive wage, which we denote by w￿(x0), is lower than the pre-regulatory competitive
wage, w￿ = b w. Firms that were competitive before regulation will be better o⁄
because their pro￿ts will have risen, and ￿rms that join the competitive sector as a
result of regulation will be better o⁄, since in the pre-regulatory equilibrium they
had the same pro￿ts as the competitive ￿rms.
We now see whether w￿(x0), is greater than or less than w￿. If all ￿rms were
competitive, then the aggregate supply of labor would, for any wage w, be equal to
A(w ￿ G ￿ ￿). The aggregate demand for labor would equal K‘c(w). w￿(x0) is
therefore de￿ned implicitly by the market-clearing expression A(w￿(x0) ￿ G ￿ ￿) =
19K‘c(w￿(x0)). It is straightforward to show that a unique w￿(x0) exists that satis￿es
this expression. Such a demonstration was in the proof of Proposition 5.
Suppose that the pre-regulation equilibrium was one of multiple equilibria, and
that another equilibrium existed in which p￿ = 0. By Proposition 5, a p￿ = 0
equilibrium exists when A(b w ￿ G ￿ ￿) ￿ K‘c(b w). In this equilibrium, the wage
would be equal to w￿(x0). Furthermore, w￿(x0) ￿ b w = w￿. Thus, although some
coordination failure may have led the economy to the two-sector equilibrium, the
p￿ = 0 equilibrium would have led to higher pro￿ts. In this case, legal intervention
accomplishes the coordination that was impossible before.
Now suppose that the pre-regulatory competitive equilibrium did not exist: A(b w￿
G￿￿) < K‘c(b w). When regulation causes ￿rms to exit the exploitative sector, there
is a chronic excess demand for labor at wage b w = w￿, so that the wage must rise to
clear the labor market. If regulation forces a competitive equilibrium that was not
possible without government intervention, it causes ￿rm pro￿ts to fall.
Next, let us consider how the welfare of children would be a⁄ected by imposing
the expected ￿ne x0. The children who stayed out of the market labor force would be
no worse o⁄, because nothing would have changed about the returns to remaining out
of the labor force. Among the children who were in the labor force before regulation,
those who had been exploited would clearly be made no worse o⁄, because they would
be released from exploitation (and their wage cannot fall lower than subsistence).
The children who were working in the competitive sector could either gain or lose,
depending on what happens to the wage. These children would lose when the post-
regulatory competitive wage is lower than before the regulation, and would gain when
it is higher.
We now consider what happens to child welfare on average. The value of staying
out of the market, U(Y +￿) = Y +￿, is clearly una⁄ected by x. However, x does a⁄ect
the expected value of market entry, ps+(1￿p)w ￿G . Average child welfare increases
with increases in this expected value. Since ~ Y +￿ = ps+(1￿p)w ￿G, this expected
value rises if and only if child labor force participation, A(ps + (1 ￿ p)w ￿ G ￿ ￿),
also rises. Therefore, we can show that the regulatory system enhances overall child
welfare by establishing the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 A legal intervention that eliminates exploitative child labor increases
the market labor force participation rate of children.
Proof. A(p￿s+(1￿p￿)w￿G￿￿) is the aggregate supply of labor, for any competitive
wage and for p = p￿. The legal intervention drives p to zero. When this happens,
then the supply of labor, at every w, becomes A(w ￿ G ￿ ￿). For any w > s,
20A(w￿G￿￿) > A(p￿s+(1￿p￿)w￿G￿￿): the supply of labor increases following
the legal intervention.
The aggregate demand for labor, as a function of w, is equal to N￿‘e + (K ￿
N￿)‘c(w). When N is driven to zero by regulatory policy, aggregate labor demand,
as a function of w, becomes K‘c(w). So long as ‘c(w) > ‘e, K‘c(w) > N￿‘e +(K ￿
N￿)‘c(w). We know that starting from an equilibrium with exploitation, ‘c(w) > ‘e.
Since for any competitive wage, both the demand and the supply of labor rise,
a regulatory policy that eliminates exploitation must raise equilibrium labor force
participation.
5.2 Enforcement Issues
We now address four issues related to the enforcement of the regulatory intervention
just described. The ￿rst is whether a permanent institutional structure is needed.
The second is whether capital ￿ ight can undermine the e⁄ectiveness of the legal
intervention. The third is whether regulation is counterproductive if enforcement is
imperfect, that is, in the event that x ￿ x0 cannot be achieved. Finally, we show
what happens if, due to problems in distinguishing exploitative child labor from
other child labor, regulatory policy also targets some child labor that is not truly
exploitative.
5.2.1 On the Need for a Permanent Regulatory Institution
We have seen that it is possible for an equilibrium with p￿ = 0 to exist in the
absence of regulation. If an enforcement institution manages to move the economy
to that equilibrium, then it will become unnecessary for the enforcement institution to
continue to exist. Pro￿ts are higher when p￿ = 0 than in the two-sector equilibrium,
so there is no incentive for any ￿rm to exploit its workers. Hence, ￿rms will be happy
to remain competitive. A temporary regulatory system thus reproduces the solution
￿rms would reach if they could coordinate in choosing their recruitment strategies.
If the p￿ = 0 equilibrium does not exist in the absence of regulation, then a
permanent enforcement institution will be necessary. In this instance, ￿rms have
an incentive to try to ￿nd ways to lower their expected costs of punishment from
exploitation. It is likely to be the case that maintaining a credible threat of punish-
ment for exploitative practices will involve the actual punishment of some violator
from time to time, and this will likely require a permanent institutional enforcement
infrastructure.
215.2.2 Capital Flight
An assumption that has been implicit in our analysis thus far is that capital is inter-
nationally immobile. Imperfect capital mobility is a fact in poor countries, where
concerns about exploitative child labor are also raised.12 However, the leap from
capital being imperfectly mobile to our assumption that it is completely immobile
may seem heroic, and so we now discuss how capital mobility a⁄ects our conclusions.
It turns out that capital ￿ ows (in￿ ows or ￿ ight) will not undermine our main results.
We begin by assuming that a pre-regulatory p￿ = 0 equilibrium exists, but that
the equilibrium observed had both exploitative and competitive ￿rms. One of the
outcomes of legal intervention in that case is to increase pro￿ts. Starting, before the
intervention, with an initial equilibrium allocation of ￿rms worldwide, an increase
in pro￿ts for ￿rms in the country that imposes x0 would be likely to attract capital
from the rest of the world, so that K would increase. The increase in K would
raise the demand for labor, increasing the market-clearing wage, and reducing the
gain in pro￿ts. Should capital arrive in su¢ cient quantity to drive pro￿ts to their
pre-regulation levels,13 there would be no further incentive for capital in￿ ows. But
in this event, competitive-sector pro￿ts would still exceed pro￿ts from becoming
exploitative, since x0 reduced exploitative pro￿ts relative to their pre-regulatory
levels. Owners of capital would be no worse o⁄ than before x0 was imposed, and
the wage would be the same as before. Children who had been exploited would be
better o⁄. The new equilibrium would thus be one with an even higher labor force
participation (than if capital ￿ ows were not allowed) and in which welfare did not
decline for any group within the country.
Now let us consider the case where a pre-regulatory p￿ = 0 equilibrium does not
exist. We have already established that in this case, setting x = x0 would reduce
competitive pro￿ts as a side e⁄ect of driving exploitative ￿rms out of existence. If
pro￿ts were higher in the rest of the world, capital would then have an incentive
to ￿ ee. A decline in the demand for labor would be the immediate consequence of
capital ￿ ight, and as a result the wage would fall. The decline in the wage would
reduce the decline in competitive pro￿ts. Should capital ￿ ee to the point where
pro￿ts climbed back to their pre-regulatory level, the p￿ = 0 equilibrium would
become sustainable: although the p￿ = 0, x = 0 equilibrium did not exist before the
capital ￿ ight occurred, if enough ￿rms depart, the equilibrium will exist. In terms
12In a survey of the literature on capital controls, Barry Eichengreen (2001) notes that there is
a robust negative relation between restrictions on capital ￿ ows and per-capita income. R. Barry
Johnston and Natalia T. Tamirisa (1998) document the pervasiveness of these controls in developing
countries.
13This could occur if the economy was small and capital mobility was perfect.
22of the model￿ s notation, prior to regulation, the p￿ = 0 equilibrium did not exist
because (by assumption) K‘c(b w) > A(b w ￿G￿￿) so that K > A(b w ￿G￿￿)=‘c(b w).
Following regulation, if K falls to the point where it equals A(b w￿G￿￿)=‘c(b w), then
p￿ = 0 will be an equilibrium. The country that imposes the ￿ne eliminates the need
for a permanent regulatory institution. The overall welfare e⁄ects of regulation are
positive: capital owners do not su⁄er; and since w￿ has not changed, the reduction
in p￿ leads to an increase in market labor force participation of children.
5.2.3 Incomplete Elimination of the Risk of Exploitation
Because it is not always the case that ￿rms bene￿t from regulation, behaviors such as
trying to "hide" exploited children, bribing inspectors to "look the other way," or the
exertion by employers of political pressure to under ￿nance enforcement institutions,
are plausible concerns. Suppose that some of these behaviors make it impossible
for the regulatory system to sustain x0. Might it be better for the enforcement
institution not to try at all if it can only maintain x 2 (0;x0)?
Dessy and Pallage (2003) ask a very similar question. To answer it, they consider
basically the same modelling of households we use here, but do not model the sorting
of ￿rms into the two sectors, and so neither the number of exploitative ￿rms nor the
probability of exploitation are equilibrium outcomes. Instead, the probability of
exploitation is a government policy instrument, which tra¢ ckers in children accept
as a constraint on their activities. Dessy and Pallage show that a decrease of the
probability that fails to prevent all exploitation (that is, to achieve p￿ = 0) could
increase the number of children exploited. This is because lowering the probability
of exploitation draws more children into the market labor force. In our notation,
even though p falls, pA(~ Y ) may go up. If the basic objective is to remove children
from exploitation, "imperfectly enforced" regulation could therefore be undesirable.
In our model, in which the optimal employment and sectoral decisions of ￿rms
determine of p￿ and N￿ endogenously, the concern Dessy and Pallage raise does
not arise. The enforcement action that reduces p is an increase in x. When
x is increased, both ^ ‘e and exploitative-sector pro￿ts decrease. Firms exit the
exploitative sector, so N falls. A rise in p is thus associated, in equilibrium, with a
fall in both N and in ^ ‘e. Therefore, pA(~ Y ) = N^ ‘e has to fall.
We conclude that any e⁄orts at enforcement that raise above zero the expected
￿ne exploitative ￿rms expect to pay can do no harm to exploited children. The
less "imperfect" the enforcement is, the better; but there is no harm in any level of
enforcement e⁄ort, or in any increase in enforcement e⁄ort.
235.2.4 Imperfect Targeting
Finally, we consider the e⁄ects of enforcement e⁄orts that are not limited to child
labor that is truly exploitative. One motivation for this exercise is the possibility
that the regulatory authorities make mistakes in distinguishing child labor that is
exploitative from child labor that is not. Another, probably more pertinent, is
that a mistake is made in the way exploitative child labor is de￿ned. For example,
ILO Convention 182 (Article 4) allows individual countries considerable leeway in
determining what child labor quali￿es as harmful to "the health, safety, or morals of
children." If that work which a country deems harmful is treated as exploitative when
it truly is not, then a legal approach targeted on exploitative child labor will, because
of a de￿nitional error, also impose penalties on some non-exploitative employers of
child workers. It is the impact of imposing these penalties on non-exploitative
employers that we consider now.
Let us again assume the economy starts out in an unregulated two-sector equi-
librium. We consider the impact of imposing the expected ￿ne, xe on exploitative
￿rms, and xc on competitive ￿rms. In what follows we suppose the expected ￿nes
can be set independently for each sector, although the analysis is very easy to modify
to allow for a relationship between the two expected ￿nes. One scenario we have in
mind is that conditional on being charged with exploitation, the ￿ne is the same for
all ￿rms that are "caught" by inspectors. However, truly exploitative child labor
is obvious, while there may be some uncertainty about whether other child labor is
exploitative. Therefore, the probability that an inspection will lead to a ￿ne being
levied is greater when exploitative ￿rms are visited. This means that xe > xc.
With the possibility of a ￿ne, competitive-￿rm pro￿ts are equal to:
￿c(w;xc) = max
‘c
f(‘c) ￿ (w + xc)‘c,
while exploitative-￿rm pro￿ts are exactly as shown in expression (21), with xe re-
placing x.
Now consider the e⁄ect on the competitive and exploitative sectors of expected
￿nes dxe > 0 and dxc > 0, taking labor force participation A(~ Y ) as given. The
￿nes reduce labor demand and pro￿ts in both sectors of the labor market, but always
lead to movement of ￿rms out of the exploitative sector and into the competitive
sector. The reason is that in the absence of any such movement, the fall in aggregate
labor demand would depress the competitive wage. Since the demand for labor by
exploitative ￿rms is unresponsive to this wage, the competitive sector would have to
absorb all of the excess supply of labor resulting from the reduced labor demand.
The competitive wage would therefore have to fall by more than xc rose. However, if
24this were to happen, then competitive-￿rm pro￿t would be higher than exploitative-
￿rm pro￿t. Firm migration from the exploitative to the competitive sector then
works toward restoring labor demand and continues until pro￿ts are again the same
in both sectors.14
As the regulatory systems leads to fewer exploitative ￿rms and a lower sta¢ ng
level at each, the probability of exploitation implied by the ￿rms side of the model
also falls. We can see explicitly that p must fall (given A(~ Y )), by returning to
the expressions that determine the two-sector market-clearing and pro￿t-maximizing
values of p and w. Those expressions are




)‘c(w + xc) = (1 ￿ p)A(~ Y ) (23)
Applying the implicit function theorem to these expressions , we get that imposing













The bracketed term in expression (24) is negative, so increases in xe and in xc
reduce the probability of exploitation. Note that the competitive-sector ￿ne does
not a⁄ect dp directly: if xc alone rose, the competitive wage would fall so as to
completely o⁄set any e⁄ects on competitive pro￿ts.
A straightforward way to predict whether the competitive equilibrium wage rises
or falls is to recall that ￿rms switch sectors until pro￿ts have been equalized in both





If ‘edxe < ‘cdxc, then dw < 0. This means that the aforementioned movement of
￿rms into the competitive sector concludes before the resulting rise in labor demand
drives the wage all of the way up to its original value. When ‘edxe < ‘cdxc, a
competitive ￿rm expects to pay a heftier total ￿ne for using child labor than does
14Pro￿t per ￿rms is again the same in both sectors, but it is lower than it was before regulation.
15We use the fact that @‘c
@w = @‘c
@xc to derive equation (24).
25an exploitative one. This would be consistent with authorities using a very broad
de￿nition of "exploitative," and ￿ning many competitive-sector ￿rms. This could
also occur if exploitative ￿rms were better-hidden than competitive ones, so that a
random inspection procedure caught (and therefore ￿ned) more competitive ￿rms
than exploitative ￿rms. In the opposite case (‘edxe > ‘cdxc), there is enough entry
into the competitive sector to drive the equilibrium wage higher than in the pre-
regulatory equilibrium.
The preceding analysis of the e⁄ects of imperfectly-targeted enforcement held
labor force participation ￿xed. For households, the e⁄ect of the regulations on labor
force participation will depend on whether the wage rose or fell. In the event that
the wage rose, the equilibrium e⁄ect of the regulations is exactly the same as in the
case depicted in Figure 4, in which dxe = dx > 0, and dxc = 0.
The welfare e⁄ects of regulation are more nuanced when the ￿nes cause the
equilibrium wage to fall. In this event, labor force participation will fall for given
p, and could well be lower in the new equilibrium. Average child welfare falls
with declines in market labor force participation. Compared to when there is no
enforcement, so long as ￿rms continue to operate, formerly exploited child laborers
are made better o⁄; but not to the extent they would have been with enforcement
targeted on exploitative work. But for some exploited children, even this welfare
improvement disappears if the regulatory system manages to eliminate all work by
children. In that case, the poorest children die.
6 Conclusion
Child labor laws should aim to protect children who work, instead of trying to re-
move children from work. In this paper, we show that a targeted legal intervention
to eliminate work that is truly exploitative of children can bene￿t all children, and
that this bene￿t is observed in the form of more children working. Our key assump-
tions for generating this result are that parents decide for each child based on their
child￿ s best interest, that parents face imperfect information about the risks their
children face upon entering the labor market, and that ￿rms may choose to exploit
this information imperfection by employing children under forced-labor-type condi-
tions. Because of these assumptions, the risk of exploitation lowers the expected
bene￿t of child labor to a child, and therefore suppresses child labor force participa-
tion. Targeted legal intervention that lowers or removes this risk raises children￿ s
participation in the labor market, child welfare, and overall societal welfare. We also
saw that legal intervention that is targeted on child labor more broadly can reduce
child labor force participation, child welfare, and overall societal welfare.
26An alternative way of viewing our results is to note that they imply that if a
legal intervention is imposed to reduce exploitative child labor and it causes child
participation in the market labor force to go down, the intervention needs to be
narrowed in its targeting so that less child labor is included. This view contains useful
guidance for policymakers and researchers because what constitutes exploitative child
labor is in fact not known with certainty, and e⁄orts are on going to de￿ne it. These
e⁄orts proceed concurrently with legal and other strategies to "combat" it, and
therefore what we propose is a way to use the results of using a legal strategy to
better de￿ne what exploitative child labor is.16
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